As other members have said, the Corrections Amendment Bill (No 2) amends the Corrections Act 2004 to create new search, detection, drug-testing, and offence provisions to help control contraband. The bill will make it harder for people to bring prohibited items into prison and make it easier to detect prohibited items and punish prisoners and others for using them. The bill will increase controls over prisoners’ communications with the outside world, enable the screening of mail, and—most important—adopt a zero tolerance approach to those staff who pass contraband to prisoners. The previous Government, notwithstanding what Mr Cosgrove said, has failed to deliver on numerous important pieces of legislation on law and order, and the failure to pass this bill represents one of them. It was too slow to introduce this bill and, indeed, it introduced it only after the then National Opposition shamed it into it, and then Labour allowed it to languish for almost a year. In doing so it unnecessarily put the safety of prison staff and the public at risk. But fortunately for New Zealanders we now have a Government with a comprehensive law and order policy, and we support this bill because it attempts to deal with issues that have been very important for a number of years.

The Government supports the bill because it will enable us to crack down on crime being committed from behind bars. It significantly enhances the ability of the Department of Corrections to control contraband and to suppress unlawful communications in prisons. We believe it will improve safety and security within the prison system and it will give guards more powers to search cells. The bill also contributes to the effectiveness of drug and alcohol programmes in prisons because such programmes simply will not be successful if prisoners have ready access to drugs. The bill means it will be harder for anyone to bring prohibited items into our prisons and easier to detect such items and punish prisoners and others for using them. This will help curb the intimidation and stand-over tactics that are associated with the presence of contraband in prisons. Specifically, the bill is going to do a number of things. It enhances existing powers and procedures for strip searching prisoners, it provides for random searches of areas such as staff lockers, it supports the integrity of drug testing in prisons by strengthening the measures against tampering with samples, and it tightens offence provisions relating to contraband. It will be an imprisonable offence for a prisoner to possess or use an electronic communication device such as a cellphone, and for anyone to possess an unauthorised item without reasonable excuse while visiting or working in a prison.

The bill also contains important measures to control prisoners’ communications. It is clear that letters containing threats, plans for further offending, and other prohibited communications are, in fact, leaving prisons. Current legislation permits prison staff to read prisoners’ mail only if a reasonable grounds test is met. In most cases there are, on the face of it, no reasonable grounds to suspect that a particular letter may need to be examined, so the bill provides that all prisoners’ mail may be read by an authorised officer, except correspondence with official agencies, members of Parliament, or legal advisers. Cellphones are not permitted in prisons and have been used for such harmful purposes as organising crimes—

Hon Phil Goff: I notice that the member on his feet is reading word for word the speech that I wrote as Minister of Corrections, and I wondered whether I could seek leave of the House to have him table the speech, which is not his speech, and save the time of the House.

Mr DEPUTY SPEAKER: You are asking for the member to—

Hon Phil Goff: I am seeking leave for a copy of the speech that I wrote and that the member is now reading to be tabled.

Mr DEPUTY SPEAKER: You cannot ask another member to table.

Hon Phil Goff: I am seeking leave to table the speech that the member is reading. It is plagiarism, because I wrote it and he is reading it.

Mr DEPUTY SPEAKER: Leave is sought for that purpose. Is there any objection? There is objection.

Hon Phil Goff: I raise a point of order, Mr Speaker. Can you help me out? Are there rules against plagiarism in this House when a member reads, word for word, a speech written by another member without acknowledging that he is doing so by admission?

Mr DEPUTY SPEAKER: These are debating points, and I am sure the member, when he takes his call, will change a few words if he feels that way inclined.

Hon Phil Goff: Do you wish to be corrections Minister, Chris?

Hon CHRISTOPHER FINLAYSON: Oh no. I am a sort of a stand-in for the Minister who is visiting a prison at the moment, but I must say that in so far as there is some overlap between the contribution of the former Minister of Corrections and this speech, at least the member will acknowledge that I can read the speech properly, unlike that member when he was trying to read questions from the sheet, like his colleague the member for Te Atatū earlier in the week, and he could not read—

Hon Darren Hughes: I thought he was Minister of Education.

Hon CHRISTOPHER FINLAYSON: No, but he was. I have learnt that. He is no longer the Minister or Education or is likely ever to be the Minister of Education again.

Hon Clayton Cosgrove: What about the law of copyright?

Hon CHRISTOPHER FINLAYSON: No, I can tell the member that there is no Crown copyright here, and if the member would like to try to sue me for what I am saying I suggest he will need a better lawyer than me to get me.

Hon Phil Goff: I think the proof is very obvious, actually. It would be an easy case to prove.

Hon CHRISTOPHER FINLAYSON: The danger will, of course, be quantum of damages and matters such as that, but if the member wants to go ahead and try to do that, good luck to him.

Hon Clayton Cosgrove: I would be happy to write all your speeches, Chris!

Hon CHRISTOPHER FINLAYSON: Well, not that member because I notice that the member for Waimakariri gave a spirited speech today, but apparently he must have a “Reader’s Digest Guide to the English Language”, because his word for the day is “salacious”. He must have repeated it like a litany about 15 times.

Hon Clayton Cosgrove: I knew you were getting excited. You were sweating.

Hon CHRISTOPHER FINLAYSON: I was. I was looking forward to some salacious details from the member and I certainly did not get any. The point is that cellphones are going to be properly monitored within prisons and, as I think everyone would admit, the implementation of these solutions is now well advanced, and it is accepted that legislation is required to deal with these issues, and I am sure, as the Leader of the Opposition would acknowledge, and would probably say in a speech that he would give in the House, communication with a prisoner may, indeed, cause grave distress to victims, particularly if it results in publication—

Hon Phil Goff: “the publication of details of the offence, or the victim” the member was going to say!

Hon CHRISTOPHER FINLAYSON: That is exactly correct.

There are a number of important issues that are raised with this bill, and I am delighted that the Opposition is adopting such a constructive approach, and by a process of ESP is apparently not only picking up the essential themes of the bill and parroting them, but also anticipating exactly the kind of contribution I am going to make.

Hon Darren Hughes: We are in Opposition; we are here to help!

Hon CHRISTOPHER FINLAYSON: Of course, the boy wonder from Ōtaki is here to help, and I look forward to having my by-election campaign with him in that highly marginal seat of Rongotai when the deputy leader of the Labour Party leaves in the not too distant future.

I think the Law and Order Committee did a very good job dealing with this legislation. It has recommended a number of amendments that I am sure the Leader of the Opposition has not had the opportunity to speak on in the first reading contribution. For example, and this will not be covered by any copyright, it strengthens forfeiture provisions in the bill and it has improved the provision prohibiting possession of unauthorised items while in prison by changing the test from “knowingly” to “without reasonable excuse”. I am sure the member for Waimakariri would immediately pick up the slight change in the test. It is a salacious change and a very important one. So there we are, these are important first steps in this legislation to improving what has been an unsatisfactory situation, and I take the opportunity to signal that this law and order Government will be introducing further measures to improve the safe, secure, humane, and effective management of the prison system.

My colleague Mrs te Heuheu summarised the bill in the course of her speech and I am not going to repeat that material here. Mr English reaffirmed the National Party’s commitment to this important work, which was started by the Bolger Government in the 1990s, and so ably assisted by Sir Tīpene O’Regan and Sir Robert Māhuta.

A number of features of this bill are particularly interesting, but none more so than Subpart 2 of Part 1, which deals with allocation principles. I am particularly interested in schedule 2, which I sincerely believe, and hope, will provide a very useful model for the future, because I have seen far too much litigation in the Treaty settlements area over the years. I go back to the fisheries litigation that started almost immediately after the 1992 settlement. It went on for about a decade. It consumed resources. It went to the Privy Council on a number of occasions, and was resolved only a couple of years ago. I had grave fears that this particular issue was on the verge of going down that path, and I am just so pleased that it has not and that today we are all supporting the third reading of this bill.

That is why schedule 2 is so very important, because it sets out a very tight timetable and has a number of particularly interesting features. As I said, I believe it could well be a model for future dispute resolution: keeping people away from courts and enabling them to resolve disputes on allocation on the basis set out in this bill. I strongly support measures where iwi acknowledge their commitment to a resolution process that, for example, promotes the mana and integrity of iwi and recognises the desirability of post-settlement collaboration.

There is no doubt that the timetable set out in schedule 2 is very tight indeed, because the parties have to identify their mana whenua interests by 1 October 2009. That particular process is to start on 1 July 2009, then there is to be negotiation through to June 2010, and, hopefully, the allocation agreement will be finalised by 30 June 2011. Very detailed processes set out that, in the event of negotiation failing to achieve a result, there will be a mediation. If that does not work, there will be an adjudication.

It may seem strange coming from one of the National Party’s justice team, but I really believe it is important that lawyers are not entitled to be present or be heard unless all parties agree. Frankly, I think that that is a welcome development in this area, because I often think that lawyers in litigation can be a cause of discord. I am delighted that lawyers will not be permitted to cross-examine witnesses, because I do not think that helps these sorts of issues, at all. I have seen attempts at cross-examination in the Waitangi Tribunal, and inevitably it is a process that, although well suited to High Court litigation, is not suited to this sort of exercise. I, for one, heartily endorse what is set out in schedule 2, and I will be keeping a very close eye on it, because I believe it will work extremely well. As I said, litigation is expensive, it is time consuming, it is draining, and there is so much truth in the old saying that it is in the public interest that there be an end to litigation.

I congratulate all iwi here today on this settlement. This was one that was inspired by iwi, driven by iwi, and achieved by iwi. May other iwi in other parts of the country look at this development and adapt it to their needs as they seek to resolve their grievances with the Crown over the next few years. As Mr English said, the National Party will actively support any and every endeavour to resolve these differences, because there is no task more important to the future of our country than this one. I congratulate all concerned. I think this is a great day for New Zealand, and I am proud to be a member of Parliament able to speak on the third reading of the Central North Island Forests Land Collective Settlement Bill.

It may be thought that these are really boilerplate provisions, but those who think that would be wrong, because clauses 7 and 8 are at the heart of the bill. As Mrs te Heuheu mentioned, those clauses are very, very significant. Clause 7 sets out the text of the acknowledgments. I am intrigued that the New Zealand First Party, which earlier this year introduced legislation complaining about principles of the Treaty—

Pita Paraone: It’s coming.

CHRISTOPHER FINLAYSON: —oh, I see, it is coming, is it—is quite happy to support the legislation. I was going to praise New Zealand First for its sensible attitude. To say that one could remove all references in this legislation to the Treaty of Waitangi and its principles would be absurd, because that is at the very heart of it. But I had better withhold my praise until the member has made his contribution. I will be interested to hear what he says about clauses 7, 8, and 12.

The acknowledgments are there for all members to read, and they should be read very carefully because they outline a litany of woe on the part of the Crown, a litany of failings, which, as clause 7(5) records, results in a sense of grievance that exists even today. Clause 8 is an extremely important clause, and it should never be regarded as nothing more than a boilerplate clause, because it sets out the apology. It is all very well for the Crown to recognise the efforts and struggles of the ancestors of the affiliate in pursuing their claims for redress, and it is all very well for the Crown to profoundly regret and apologise for breaches of the Treaty in its principles, but, importantly, the Crown goes further than that. I refer to clause 8(4), which states that “the Crown seeks to atone for these wrongs and assist the process of healing with this settlement, and looks forward to building a relationship of mutual trust and co-operation with the Affiliate.”

So often in these settlements the Crown has apologised, has said it is going to atone, and then moves on to something else and promptly forgets that, once the bill is enacted, the relationship between the Crown and the affiliate has undergone a fundamental change. The Crown has obligations under this legislation that it must not ignore or forget. So often, in my experience, the Crown gets into trouble as it has no institutional memory, and therefore moves on to the next issue of the day and forgets that the relationship has indeed changed. It behoves this place to make sure that that never happens.

Next I refer to clause 12, which deals with the meaning of affiliate historical claims. The Minister’s amendment, which was tabled today, proposes an amendment by adding a new subclause (5). I must say I think that amendment is sensible, even though I share the view of the Minister that it is probably legally, or strictly, unnecessary and is there, as he says, to avoid doubt.

Subpart 3 deals with the mechanics of settlement—settlement of affiliate historical claims is final—and there is the consequential amendment to the Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975. In particular, schedule 3 is amended by including this legislation once it is enacted. Subpart 4 deals with miscellaneous matters such as perpetuities, access to the deed of settlement, and the date on which actions or matters must occur. There is no real magic in that, and I need not detain the Committee by dwelling on Subpart 4. National will support the passage of Part 1.

As I have said before, the tribunal report does not make pleasant reading. It was highly critical of the Labour Government’s conduct of the Te Arawa negotiation. It said, among other things, that aspects of the Crown’s processes of dealing with overlapping groups were inconsistent with the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi. It said the Crown failed to act fairly and impartially towards all claimants. It said: “Future settlements cannot proceed like this. The Crown cannot continue to ‘pick favourites’ and make decisions on tribal interests in isolation, based on inadequate information.” The tribunal said that the Crown’s failures in respect of consultation over commercial redress constituted a breach by the Crown of its Treaty duties to act honourably and with the utmost good faith, and failed actively to protect the interests of all Māori. The tribunal described the Crown’s failure to adapt its policy to the unique situation of overlapping cultural and commercial interests as inflexible, inappropriate, and inadequate.

On page 67 of its report, the tribunal said this: “We see Treaty settlements as critical to the future of our country. For this reason, we consider that any recommendation that a proposed settlement not proceed should be made only as an absolute last resort. However, on balance, we cannot endorse the KEC settlement in this form. We have not made this decision lightly, but we have grave concerns about the impact of this settlement on overlapping iwi, and on the durability of future CNI settlements.” So this damning report made it clear that the Labour Government had suspended the laws of averages. It got everything wrong. After 8 years of this Government, where little or no progress had been made on finalising Treaty settlements, 2007 certainly was a watershed year; doing nothing was replaced by a policy of messing up everything Labour touched.

The Minister generously referred to the leadership of Mr te Heuheu, and I endorse what he said. As a result of that leadership, ably assisted by Wira Gardiner, central North Island iwi came together and presented a proposal to the Crown. It was this proposal that ultimately led to the central North Island deed of settlement being signed on 25 June. In my first reading speech I praised the proposal, which, as the committee report said, was best summarised as being iwi-driven and regional. Stung by its litany of failures in 2007, the Crown, this year at least, did not get in the way and considered the proposal. The deed having been signed, the legislation came to the House and, as the Minister observed, has now come back from the select committee very quickly indeed.

In the course of his speech, the Minister addressed some of the issues raised by the select committee report. I endorse everything the Minister said about the hopes for a settlement involving Ngāti Rangitihi. I endorse what he said about the novel resolution process and, finally, what he said about public access.

In my first reading speech I indicated I had a real interest in the allocation model, and I want now to focus on this aspect of the bill. Several submitters opposed the commercial allocation model or the tikanga-based mana whenua resolution process. They said the allocation of commercial benefits, set out in schedule 3, was disproportionate because it ignored the extensive and legitimate claims of smaller iwi, thus depriving them of their rights over customary lands. When we come to deal with Part 2, particularly Subpart 2 on allocation principles, I will say something about clauses 14 and 15. The submitters also said that the commercial allocation model should be based on mana whenua, rather than on population, and that it was important to determine who held mana whenua before commercial benefits were allocated. In response, the committee was told that the proportions derived from the commercial allocation model, and included as schedule 3 to the bill, were the result of unanimous agreement and full consensus. They also said it was appropriate that iwi, rather than the Crown, determine title to the land through a tikanga-based mana whenua resolution process, which is set out in schedule 2. It was noted, also, that all the collective iwi had to compromise. Compromise was made possible by the separation of commercial benefits flowing from the land itself.

The committee also heard submissions on schedule 2, and when we come to the Committee stage I will certainly be looking very closely at that schedule, which sets out the steps required for a tikanga-based resolution process for Crown central North Island forests land. It is a very interesting process indeed. One of the issues will be whether it will oust in its entirety the prospect of judicial review proceedings, because I am well aware of what happened after the fisheries settlement in 1992. From 1993 onwards there were debates in the courts about the allocation of quota, or the leasing of quota, and of course there was the great allocation debate that went to the Privy Council, on three occasions, I think. It is extremely important, for the timely resolution of all these matters, that schedule 2 works and that it prevents unnecessary court proceedings, but I will be saying something about whether it effectively does so when we look at schedule 2.

The committee was advised that the collective decided to separate the allocation of commercial benefits of the settlement from ownership of the land, so land is to be allocated according to the mana that iwi traditionally held and exercised over the land, determined according to tikanga. This resolution process means that iwi, rather than the Crown, are primarily responsible for determining the allocation of the title to the forest land. Officials consider that this is appropriate and will enhance the durability of the settlement, and I certainly hope they are right. The collective does not expect mana whenua allocation to be in proportion to financial allocation. Those with greater mana whenua will receive greater land allocation and, after the agreed period of 35 years, the rental streams associated with the land.

• Debate interrupted.

But I come to clause 7 in Part 2 of the bill, which may provide us with some guidance. Clause 7(1) is the standard privative clause, and it is not dissimilar to section 6 of the Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975, as amended by section 40 of the Treaty of Waitangi (Fisheries Claims) Settlement Act 1992. In fact, it is very similar, because section 40 provides: “… the Tribunal will not have jurisdiction to inquire or further inquire into, or make any finding or recommendation in respect of,— … Commercial fishing … The Deed of Settlement … or … Any enactment …”. In a 1996 case the Court of Appeal stated that the effect of that clause—the so-called privative clause—in section 6(7) of the Treaty of Waitangi Act was to oust the jurisdiction of the tribunal.

Then we come to clause 7(2) of this bill, which is an interesting clause. It states that “Subsection (1) does not exclude the jurisdiction of a court, tribunal, or other judicial body in respect of the interpretation or implementation of the deed of settlement or this Act.” So any question of the interpretation of the legislation, which would include the schedules, obviously, would be available in jurisdictional terms for a court or a tribunal to consider, as would any question of implementation.

It would seem on the face of it that the jurisdiction of the court is not ousted and that clause 6(15) of schedule 2 may not be the end of the road. I really think that we ought to be crystal clear about this, because I believe, based on my experience of the fisheries allocation saga, that there could well be litigation, although I agree with what my colleagues have said—that given the parties involved and the desire to reach a settlement, one would certainly hope that there would be a conclusion of the allocation debate, if there is to be a debate, by 25 June 2011. But the Minister’s contribution on the allocation model and on whether it is intended to be final and oust the jurisdiction of the courts is very important, because on the face of it I do not think it does that.

All I want to do in closing is address the question of public access. It has been comprehensively dealt with in the bill. It is not an issue between the parties. The deed of settlement requires the Crown to grant public access easements over the forests prior to the settlement date, and we can deal with that issue in the Committee stage. Clauses 10 and 11 deal with the issue, and they are substantially the same as the clauses that the Committee of the whole House debated last night in the context of the Affiliate Te Arawa Iwi and Hapu Claims Settlement Bill; I refer to Supplementary Order Paper 250, which brought into that bill clauses 130A and 130B. The intent is the same, even if there are minor differences in wording.

With those closing comments, I believe that all the issues have been considered and that there is no impediment to the bill proceeding through all its stages as quickly as possible.

Clause 13 provides—I think, sensibly—that the adjudication panel will have complete discretion to determine the process and the timetable for the hearing. That complete discretion is subject to certain requirements, and they are more particularly set out in paragraphs (a) to (g). For example, paragraph (g) provides that a decision is to be reached by 25 June 2011. But I am interested in paragraph (e), which states: “there is a right to question witnesses;”. What I would like to know, and maybe we need clarification, is whether that right to question witnesses relates only to the adjudication panel, or whether an iwi claimant can also ask questions of another iwi claimant. If I were to proffer an opinion, I would say it means both: that the panel could ask questions, but that iwi claimants should also have the right to test evidence by way of cross-examination—by asking questions of witnesses for other iwi.

What we do not want, in the course of the adjudication panel hearing this matter, is to have some kind of eleventh hour application for judicial review. I know that these sorts of questions have been subject to judicial review in the context of commissions of inquiry. I seem to recall a case concerning someone called Badger, where the person presiding over the commission of inquiry was a former Attorney-General, Dr Martyn Finlay, and the case was held up for some time while the parties went to the courts.

That is my interpretation, but I would be very grateful if the Minister could give some guidance. Does the right relate to the panel alone asking questions, or is there also the right of iwi claimants to ask questions and to test the written evidence that will have been filed by another iwi claimant?

I forwarded to the Minister a couple of comments that have been made to me, and I will now record some of those questions and perhaps get some answers to them. The first definition is that of “author”. Everyone recognises, of course, that for the purposes of this scheme an author has to be a natural person. But I have a couple of questions about subclauses (6), (7), and (8) of new clause 4A, which is proposed to be inserted in the bill by Supplementary Order Paper 246.

Subclause (6) states: “ ‘Author’ does not include a person who writes or illustrates a book as part of his or her duties under a contract of service or a contract for services.” This phrase seems to catch both employees and those commissioned. That seems to be the case even if, as is the case with academics, copyright for the work remains with the author. I am not quite clear whether the intention is to cover books that are written after the conclusion of a publishing contract. It seems to me that authors who wish to benefit from the scheme ought to be clear that the publishing contract they sign is expressly not a contract for service.

Subclauses (7) and (8) state: “ ‘Author’ does not include a person who receives payment for writing or illustrating a book wholly by way of a fee.” and “ ‘Author’ does not include a person who paid a third party to publish the person’s book.” Looking at it from a first-principles basis and not from the point of view that that is what is in the scheme already, I have difficulties working out why both those categories of person are excluded. Surely how the author is paid or whether he or she has contributed to publication costs will be irrelevant if the book proves popular in New Zealand libraries.

Let us take this hypothetical situation. A person may have difficulty getting his or her book published, so the person self-publishes, and the book then turns out to be very popular. It is sold in bookshops around the town and becomes very popular in New Zealand libraries. Looking at it from a point of principle, I ask why that person should be denied access to the benefits of the public lending right. I know the immediate answer is that that is not what the scheme currently provides. That is all very well; I acknowledge that. But looking at it from a first-principles basis, I ask why those people are not included, given that this is the time to review the public lending right scheme.

The second definition is “book”. The first clarification made in new clause 4B is that “ ‘Book’ means a publication that—(a) is listed in the national bibliographic database of the National Library of New Zealand …”. There are certain exceptions. There is a curious exclusion in new clause 4B(3) of “a text book intended for use in schools.” Those types of books are not included.

But let us take this hypothetical situation. Someone writes a book—for instance, Owen Marshall: Selected Stories, edited by Vincent O’Sullivan. It proves to be very popular in our shops and is regarded as the locus classicus of short stories in New Zealand, and it becomes the standard text for year 13 English students. It is used as a textbook. Therefore, why would that book be necessarily excluded?

Perhaps the hypothetical situation is slightly off-key, because the Supplementary Order Paper states “intended for use in schools.” What does that phrase mean? Maybe when the author was writing it he intended that ultimately it would be for use in schools. Those are just a couple of the questions I have on the definitions of both “author” and “book”.

New clause 4C defines a “New Zealand author” as “an author who—(a) is a New Zealand resident as defined in … the Income Tax Act 2007;” and who also satisfies certain other conditions. I have less of a problem with this definition, although it has been pointed out to me that there is an issue with what to do about expatriate writers. Someone who goes to live in Menton under the residency that is made available for authors and decides to stay there and continue writing for 4 or 5 years presumably does not qualify in terms of the Income Tax Act as a “New Zealand author”, but is still very much a New Zealander. I mentioned Katherine Mansfield as a hypothetical expatriate writer, and the Minister’s advisers said very helpfully that Katherine Mansfield is, of course, dead. I was most grateful for that information. I had not realised it! One can see hypothetically that an issue could arise, so I would be grateful for some guidance on that.

In the course of preparing for this debate I brought down to the Chamber a couple of books that I am reading at the moment. I started with the doyen of short stories in New Zealand, Owen Marshall, who has written a splendid text. But I just notice—and I would be grateful for the Minister’s guidance on it—that copyright in this text is actually held by two people. The introduction and the selection are by Vincent O’Sullivan, and the stories themselves are by Owen Marshall. This book currently qualifies for a payment under the Authors’ Fund and will qualify, one would hope, under the new regime that is being established. One works out that payments ought to be made to the author, but how does one sort out in a situation like this one, where there are two authors—Vincent O’Sullivan for the introduction and Owen Marshall for the substantive part of the book—who is to get what and in what proportions?

Of course, it is much easier with another book I am reading, My Father’s Shadow: A Portrait of Justice Peter Mahon by Sam Mahon. That case is quite easy, because he is a New Zealand author and, therefore, qualifies, and he is the only person who holds the copyright. If his book qualifies, then so be it.

To illustrate the principle of what would not qualify, the third book is a book written by the former British Foreign Secretary David Owen. It is called In Sickness and in Power. Members may know that when the Labour Party in England went crazy in the late 1970s and early 1980s, David Owen went off and formed the Social Democratic Party. Mr Barnett looks up; I think he was an active member in the Social Democratic Party. But anyway, at the conclusion of his time David Owen looked back and wrote a book called In Sickness and in Power. It is a very interesting book, and I recommend it to Mr Barnett when he is flying back to England. In fact, I may even give him my copy, because I think it would be good for him to read it.

As David Owen says, it has been observed for centuries that something happens to people’s mental stability when they are in power. The causal link between holding power and aberrant behaviour that has the whiff of mental instability about it was captured by Bertrand Russell’s phrase “the intoxication of power”. David Owen says that power is a heady drug, which not every political leader has the necessary rooted character to counteract: a combination of common sense, humour, decency, scepticism, and even cynicism. He then starts talking about hubris.

I think I may give this book to Mr Barnett as a farewell present, because I can certainly pick up another one from Parsons later on. But there is an example of a book that does not qualify, because it is not by a New Zealand author. It would not be entitled to payments under the public lending right scheme.

So I have some questions for the Minister, as to the definitions of both “author” and “book”, and I think we ought to touch on—albeit briefly—the definition of “New Zealand author”. When one is dealing with this legislation on a first-principles basis, I do not think it is enough to say: “Oh well, these matters are already included in the guidelines for the New Zealand Authors’ Fund. To broaden the definitions would extend the scheme to more titles and authors.” I think that is a pragmatic answer but not a principled answer, so I would be most grateful for the Minister’s comments.

I simply say that I am particularly interested in recital (4), which talks about the way in which the allocation is to occur. It refers to the terms of the deed of trust. As we heard last night from the Minister in charge of Treaty of Waitangi Negotiations, almost 86.5 percent of the beneficial interest in the forests is to be held for the collective, “and the individual beneficial entitlement of each member of that Collective is to be determined by reference to the allocation process that has been agreed amongst those members and is set out in this Act.” That is a reference, first, to schedule 3, which sets out the percentages for allocation of rental proceeds. I must say that I think those percentages have been prepared to an admirable level. For example, Tūhoe are entitled to 27.2987 percent of the total, and how that was worked out, I do not know.

More particularly, I will focus on schedule 2, which deals with the way in which the allocation process is to occur. As we can see from that schedule, which I will look at in far greater detail when we get to it, there are essentially three stages. I am particularly interested in stage 3, and the effect of that type of adjudication process on the ability of courts to interfere in any decision that may be reached.

The preamble is a quite straightforward part of the bill. It sets out the background, and it sets out that the Crown and the collective agreed to negotiate in good faith, have established a framework, and have established the percentages and a means by which each individual member of the collective is to be allocated a particular portion. I think that is all I need to say about the preamble; we must move on and get to the real heart of the bill.

The heart of the matter is clause 10, “Matters that may be dealt with in regulations”. As I said in my second reading speech, there were some concerns about the extent of the regulation-making powers. Sir Geoffrey Palmer, that zealous constitutionalist, thought that the regulation-making power was too broad, and that is why, in Part 1, we included definitions of “author”, “New Zealand author”, and “book”. As a consequence of that, the Minister’s Supplementary Order Paper says there will need to be a minor amendment to clause 10(2) to provide that the regulations may add conditions to the definitions of “author”, “book”, “New Zealand author”, and “New Zealand library”, and of course we support that because it is a necessary consequential amendment, given what we have done in Part 1.

The advisory group will be established, and these are persons who must have appropriate skills to administer the scheme. Importantly, the advisory group must include at least one representative from organisations of authors, and at least one representative from organisations of librarians. These people will be appointed for a term of not less than 5 years, although the terms may be renewed. I think that the way in which the advisory group is set up is sensible. It does not allow capture by a particular group, so a broader range of interests will need to be taken into account when determining the way in which the scheme is to operate. I am hopeful the advisory group will work well. I should not have thought it would need to meet all that regularly. Certainly in the initial period there will be quite a lot of work to do, but thereafter the only issues that will arise for consideration are the book rate and the frequency with which the book rate is to be altered.

That is all that one needs to say, really, about Part 2. It is all pretty straightforward and we can move on.