Hon Christopher Finlayson

Hon CHRISTOPHER FINLAYSON (Attorney-General) : Hearing the dulcet tones of Lynne Pillay takes me back to those very happy days between 2005 and 2008 when we were getting ready for Government and she was the chair of the Justice and Electoral Committee. How we enjoyed working collaboratively and positively together on the electoral finance legislation! It was one of the thrills of my life! I regret to say that I was the one who was responsible for pulling the National members out of that select committee visit to Australia, because we do not believe in trips like that, which are primarily vacations.

I remember receiving the itinerary from Ms Pillay, and I was so disappointed. I think there were two or three meetings a day, and she and her colleagues were going to be holed up at the Park Hyatt. They were going to be travelling business class, but I believe that people should fly economy class across the Tasman. I said: “Well, I am sorry, but the National members are required at home to serve the people.”, and we pulled out of the trip. But, nonetheless, I do acknowledge the honourable member, and I say that the Sentencing Council, which was an appalling edifice designed to straitjacket judges into giving particular sentences, is now consigned to the trash heap of history, just like the electoral finance legislation.

I want to say something about Part 4 of the Limitation Bill, because Part 4 contains some very interesting general provisions that relate to claims made in arbitration, limitation defences, and other enactments contracting out of defences and the pleading of defences. I refer honourable members to clause 41, which is one of the more fundamental principles of the bill. It says that if a defendant establishes a defence against a claim under the Limitation Act, then the court or tribunal cannot grant the relief sought but the claim itself is not extinguished. So one is prevented from bringing the claim, but the claim is not extinguished. That is at the very heart of what this limitation legislation is all about.

The other interesting part of Part 4—and I do not know that I have ever seen it before—is that the 1950 Act will be with us for many years, so the 1950 Act is amended and then repealed. The Acts specified in the schedule are consequently amended, and these are the important transitional provisions that officials work very hard on to knock into shape. I do not think I have ever seen a situation where an Act is amended and then repealed, but it will continue to apply to claims relating to events before 1 January 2011 and it will require claims to be brought by the latter of 15 years of the date of the act or omission or 5 years after the new Act commences. That is why clauses 23A to 23D are included. They bring across provisions to the 1950 Act relating to the longstop period and the discretion to allow relief, for example, for an action of abuse of an infant or the gradual process injury that we have been talking about.

The only other point I make—and it is good that the law finally is clarified in this country—relates to clause 53. That will provide that the clause will apply to a civil proceeding before a New Zealand court or tribunal whenever the substantive law of a foreign country is to be applied in that proceeding, and it provides that the limitation of that foreign country is part of the substantive law of the country and must be applied accordingly. For many years there was academic debate about whether limitation law was procedural or substantive. The Choice of Law (Limitation Periods) Act 1993 of New South Wales and the Foreign Limitation Periods Act 1984 of the UK clarified the point for those jurisdictions, and it is now clarified here. I note also in clause 54 the public policy exception for limitation law of foreign countries is to apply except in relation to Australia. Part 4, as I said, contains some very important transitional provisions. The reason for that is that the 1950 legislation will be with us for many years to come.