Hon Christopher Finlayson

Hon CHRISTOPHER FINLAYSON (Attorney-General) : I will not speak at any length on Part 1, which simply outlines the preliminary provisions, but I do want to say something about Part 2, which is, in many respects, the core of the bill and sets out that there are to be defences to money claims.

People will have 6 years from the events on which a claim is based to bring their claim before a defendant can argue that the claim is time-barred. If the claimant did not know about the claim within this time, he or she has an extra 3-year late knowledge period in which to make the claim. However, and this has been referred to by a number of speakers in the second reading debate, after 15 years from the date of those events, the defendant can argue that the claim is time-barred, and money claims are defined in clause 11.

I hear what Mr Parker said in his second reading speech, and I indicate to him that I was grateful for the very useful discussion we had about clause 16, which I think improved it. But I do take issue with him over the different periods. It all depends, at the end of the day, on the policy considerations governing a particular piece of legislation. This bill sets out the general rules of limitation.

There are, nonetheless, specific limitation periods in specific statutes for particular policy reasons. So, for example, in the Fair Trading Act, the period in which one can bring a claim is 3 years. In the Commerce Act there are, as I recall, a number of different periods because of the requirements of that legislation. In the Family Protection Act there is a particular limitation period that differs from what is contained in this legislation. So uniformity, I think, is to be encouraged, and it is one of the reasons why we have dealt with this legislation. Although it may seem to be rather boring technical legislation, it actually has very real consequences for people when they seek to bring claims in court. But, in my opinion, there is a difference between the 10-year period set out in the Building Act and the 15-year period here. As I say, this is a statute of general applicability.

The second point I want to address concerns clause 16, which is a very important clause. Mr Parker has accurately outlined the way in which this legislation has developed, and in particular the way in which clause 16 was amended by the Justice and Electoral Committee. In one of the early drafts of the bill, clause 16 was not there at all, and then it was decided to provide a clause that gave discretion to allow relief for a claim of sexual abuse of a minor because of the particularly horrific nature of that kind of proceeding. But it has been broadened out, and a number of changes have emerged as a result of the select committee’s deliberations.

Importantly—and this is brought out in new clause 16A—there is the omission of the requirement that the strength of the claimant’s case is to be a matter to be taken into account in exercising its discretion. As Mr Parker said, that widens the scope of clause 16 to include physical and psychological abuse of minors by parents, step-parents, and close relatives or associates, and it extends the discretion to allow relief for claims for personal injury caused by gradual process, infection, or disease that is not covered by accident compensation. So it is a very important change, and I agree with speakers who contributed during the second reading that it does improve the legislation. How many claims will there be? Well, who knows, but this is a particular form of harm and it is appropriate that we provide for it in this legislation.